Synthesis Alter-Eco Seminar: Erik Bordeleau, TheSphere: A new organizational form, a research-creation project experimenting with Web 3.0 technology to explore new ecologies of funding for the performing arts

Synthesis Alter-Eco Seminar (5 April 2022)

TheSphere
A new organizational form, a research-creation project experimenting with Web 3.0 technology to explore new ecologies of funding for the performing arts
Erik Bordeleau (Lisbon)

 (Alter-Eco)

The Sphere challenges the traditional frameworks of cultural production. Our goal is to redistribute the risks and opportunities of making art by facilitating the involvement of audiences and other potential stakeholders at different stages of the curation and creative process. The Sphere is about new ways of being creative together, making the success of one performance a catalyst for the whole art community.


How do we undo business as usual? How do we generate new ecologies of funding, in the arts and beyond, enabling new ways of coming together in order to answer the tremendous challenges of the Anthropocene which await us? In order to turn the world into a swarm of living commons rather than self-abstracting, debased corporate entities, we need to engage further into how monetary systems, financial apparatuses and business models actually work. We need to design otherwise types of feedback loops, and imagine other modes of capture that escape the tight grip of reductive economic abstractions and anti-social storing of value. That is: We need to make our economies weird again.

IPCC Climate Change Report: Laudato si' Pope Francis’ encyclical

The 2021 IPCC Climate Change Report is considerably watered down because all governments had to agree line by line. Nonetheless it’s the most definitive world assessment we have.
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/

Worth reading (before and after?), Pope Francis’ encyclical : Laudato si' 

Writing in water: dense responsive media in place of relational interfaces

"Writing in water: dense responsive media in place of relational interfaces”, AIS 2021.

In this essay we explore extensive modes of enactive engagement among humans, physical and computational media richer than the modes represented by classical notions of interaction and relation. We make use of a radically material and a potential-theoretic account of event to re-conceive ad hoc, non-pre-schematized activity in responsive environments. We can regard such activity as sense-making via dehomogenization of material that co-articulates subjects and objects.

abduction (by David Morris)

One of the clearest explanations of (Peircean) abduction, by David Morris.

…[A]bduction is so central it is hard to get it square in view, although Peirce does have texts that focus on it. To pierce to the quick, here are some of the things Peirce says: (1) Abduction is a procedure of rational inquiry. (2) It is a kind of inference that is insightful. (3) Abduction is neither deduction nor induction. (4) In contrast to deduction or induction, abduction adds something new to thought, namely hypotheses—and “hypothesis” is Peirce’s other name for abduction. As Peirce puts it, “the essence of an induction is that it infers from one set of facts to another set of similar facts, whereas hypothesis infers from facts of one kind to facts of another.” Peirce’s repeated example is of beans in a bag. From the fact that all the beans in the blue bag are white and that this handful of beans is from the blue bag, we can deduce that the beans in this handful are white; the deduction is certain because it adds nothing new to the facts; it just puts them a different way. If it is the case that beans taken from the blue bag keep turning up white, we conclude by induction that all beans in the blue bag are white. Here too the induction does not give us a new sort of fact, for it quantifies in a probabilistic way over facts already given about colors of beans in a bag. Abduction is different: it starts from the facts that one of the bags of beans in the room, say the blue bag, contains only white beans and that this handful of beans, which was taken from a single bag, contains all white beans; the inference by abduction is that this handful of beans is from the blue bag. Put another way, in its context, this hypothesis is the best possible explanation for the fact that the beans are white in color. Notice that the abduction yields another kind of fact: from facts about colors of beans to a hypothesis about which bag the beans are from. Sherlock Holmes uses abductive reasoning all the time, which is what astonishes Watson: it is not surprising that someone studying the color of swans might claim all swans are white, but it is surprising that someone given facts about dogs not barking in the night can confidently claim that so and so is the culprit.

Muindi F Muindi, On World-Making

Part I from

Muindi F Muindi

The artist makes sensations in a given world — the artist composes sights (visual sensations), sounds (aural sensations), smells (olfactory sensations), tastes (gustatory sensations), touches (tactile sensations), etc.

The philosopher makes conceptions of a given world — the philosopher establishes the significance, the whither and wherefore, of different sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, etc.

The scientist makes predictions about a given world — the scientist figures out whether it is likely and how likely it is to encounter different sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, etc.

But neither the artist, nor the philosopher, nor the scientist can be said to make a world — for the making of a world precedes, exceeds, and succeeds the making of sensations, conceptions, and predictions. 

The world that we come to sense in and through art, and to conceive of in and through philosophy, and to make predictions about in and through science is a world that is taken as a given by the artist, philosopher, and scientist; it is not a world that they make themselves in and by doing art, philosophy, or science.

Relations are what make worlds, which is to say, in other words, that making a world means making relations. 

Sensations, conceptions, and predictions articulate the relations that precede, exceed, and succeed them. The figure of the artist enables us to sense established relations, the figure of the philosopher enables us to conceive of established relations, and the figure of the scientist enables us to make predictions about established relations, but none of these figures actually establish relations themselves. Establishing relations is an extra-artistic affair for the artist, an extra-philosophical affair for the philosopher, and an extra-scientific affair for the scientist.

A world-making project is neither an artistic project, nor a philosophical project, nor scientific project. Rather, a world-making project is the condition for artistic, philosophical, and scientific projects. Artists, philosophers, and scientists who cannot take the world that conditions their practices for granted find that they must act as world-makers in addition to acting as artists, philosophers, and scientists: they find that they must make the worlds that others will take as given.

The power of touch: is this the sense we’ve missed most?

Hi Yanjun, Vangelis,

It’s useful to see this long Guardian news paper article as a thoughtful portal to extensive research on haptic sense and, more fundamentally, on embodiment (Merleau-Ponty, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, etc.).


“The power of touch: is this the sense we’ve missed most?”